CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alessandro Vattani (Italy)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 698th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria and the representative of Myanmar. Allow me to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Ambassador Wolfgang Schallenberg. We are grateful for the interest which Austria continues to show in this forum and I am sure we all look forward to hearing his statement with interest. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome in our midst the new representatives of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye, and Morocco, Ambassador Mohamed-Nacer Bendjelloun-Touimi, who is with us for the first time today. I should like to assure them of our full cooperation and support in their new functions.

On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, allow me to extend a cordial welcome to those representatives of the non-governmental organizations present today in the public gallery, who, in accordance with what has become a well-established tradition, will present to the Conference a message to celebrate International Women's Day. As you know, International Women's Day is normally celebrated on 8 March, but in view of the fact that the NGO community will be involved in the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen on that day, it was felt appropriate to take this opportunity to receive their message. I am sure the Conference joins me in extending our very best wishes to all the women present in the room today and saying how much we appreciate their constant commitment to peace and disarmament and their continued interest in our labours.

I should now like to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, who will read out their message to the Conference.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message reads as follows:

"Esteemed members of the Conference on Disarmament:

"We are honoured to be able to address you again this year, as we commemorate International Women's Day. Due to the World Summit for Social Development taking place in Copenhagen on the official date of International Women's Day, 8 March, we are having our women's gathering earlier this year.

"We, women from different countries and organizations, are gathering for the seminar on 'International security: A feminist perspective for the future'. We are focusing on security as it relates to environment, development, international relations, disarmament and to highlight their interdependencies. A comprehensive strategy for peace from a women's perspective consists of a holistic approach to overcoming

(Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

the varied and multiple forms of violence which plague human society and erode the basis of human security. The interests of human security can best be served by a transition from the culture of war, which now prevails, to a culture of peace.

"There is a vital link between people-centred development and the use of resources. As we approach the twenty-first century, women worldwide are appalled by the use of a large part of the world economic resources for the production and sale of weapons meant for destruction. We see global and complete disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons as essential for secure and sustainable development of societies. Therefore, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is of great importance to us and we support you in your efforts to conclude agreements that can make our lives and our planet safer.

"There are several topics currently under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament. One of which is the issue of the agenda. For the first time since 1978, the agenda of the CD has been brought into the spotlight for review, evaluation and possible expansion. We hope that the members of the CD take this long overdue opportunity to adopt an imaginative approach to meeting the needs of today's world. One such item to be considered would be the growing problem of anti-personnel land-mines and the use of conventional weapons in general. Women bear a heavy burden when conventional weapons are used, and are often left to pick up the pieces of the lives of those who survive. Land-mines pose a real hazard for civilians and humanitarian workers, so it is both practical and necessary to ban the development, use, transfer, manufacturing and stockpiling of such weapons. These types of issues should be considered in the work of the CD, and therefore we call upon the CD to contribute to the debate of this important issue.

"The testing, manufacture and use of conventional and nuclear weapons remain a deadly threat to people and the environment. Nuclear testing must be halted and the production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials banned. Many women and men around the world are anxiously awaiting the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and there was hope that this would be in 1995. A CTBT is desperately needed to prevent the development of new types of nuclear weapons designs and systems, as well as to stop the proliferation of these weapons. While certain issues need to be negotiated before a CTBT is achieved, total and complete disarmament has to remain the ultimate goal in any negotiations that take place.

"We are concerned that the nuclear-weapons States are missing the opportunities presented by the end of the cold war, and putting at risk the NPT and non-proliferation regime. START I and II and the INF have been significant achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, and we encourage the members of the CD to continue in this direction and ultimately fulfil their obligations under article VI for complete nuclear

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disarmament. It is time for new threat assessments, not for targeting new enemies, which take into account the health and environmental damage from past and future nuclear production, and the risks to life on Earth if nuclear weapons are used again. We applaud the vision which brought about the 1992 chemical weapons Convention, and urge the Conference on Disarmament now to pull together to conclude a CTBT this year. We would also urge the CD to begin negotiations forthwith on a nuclear weapons convention, banning production, stockpiling and acquisition, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons under international and environmental safeguards.

"The mobilization of public opinion around security and disarmament issues is essential. Non-governmental organizations can facilitate this process by using our global links to disseminate information and widen the debate. More involvement of women at all levels of decision-making, in NGOs, the United Nations and the CD delegations, is desperately needed. We would urge the Conference on Disarmament to consider enlarging the role of NGOs in the work of the CD. Our voices represent the voices of many women around the world who want to see a better, brighter future.

"This address to the CD comes at an especially appropriate time. As we remember with horror the beginning of the nuclear age 50 years ago with the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we anxiously await the end of this tragic era. Let 1995 be remembered as a crucial moment of history marked by the end of the nuclear arms race. The United Nations, now in its fiftieth year, is in the unique position to facilitate this transition. It is everyone's responsibility to work for a peaceful future. But we look to you, having a particular responsibility for disarmament, which is an essential component of the conditions for life to continue.

"We wish you every success as you take up this formidable challenge and again assure you of our full cooperation.

"Signed by: Hungarian Peace Association, International Peace Bureau, International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations, Swedish Peace Council, Third World Movement against the Exploitation of Women, War Resisters International, Women for Peace, France, Women for Peace, Geneva, Women in Black, Great Britain, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Women's World Summit Foundation, World Young Women's Christian Association."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for having read out the very significant message of the NGO community on the occasion of International Women's Day.

(The President)

Before giving the floor to the speakers inscribed today, I wish to inform you that it is my intention to suspend the plenary after listening to the speakers inscribed today, and to convene an informal plenary meeting immediately in order to consider the request from Viet Nam to participate in the work of the CD and take up again the issue which we started to consider at our informal meeting last Thursday, 9 February. This informal meeting will again be restricted to members of the Conference only.

I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Ambassador Wolfgang Schallenberg.

Mr. SCHALLENBERG (Austria) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all allow me to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of this Conference for the first part of its 1995 session. My Government is happy to see in this office the representative of Italy, a neighbouring country with which Austria maintains excellent and cordial relations. Your expertise as well as your spirit of pragmatism and conciliation are well known to all of us, and I am sure that you will be able to give our work here the impetus and guidance that is necessary in order to make progress towards our objective. I also wish to express the respect Austria has for the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky. Mr. Petrovsky is not only well known for his exemplary experience in the area of disarmament, but is also considered by my Government and by all of us as a good friend of Austria. Our delegation greatly appreciates the quality of work provided by the secretariat under his direction as well as that of his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

We are all well aware - as the United Nations Secretary-General also indicated, indeed, in his message addressed to the opening meeting - that this annual session of the Conference on Disarmament coincides with an historic moment for disarmament in general as well as for international security and stability. The Conference, so well known for its expertise, has always made in the past, and will continue to make in the future, major contributions to the solution of global disarmament problems. When I speak of an historic moment I am referring first of all to the fact that we find ourselves this year exactly 50 years after the end of the Second World War, after the first use of a nuclear weapon, after the founding of the United Nations and 50 years also after the liberation and restoration of the independence of Austria. To all this we can add the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, later this year, the holding of the review and extension Conference for this treaty.

As you know, Austria is a contracting party, as a non-nuclear weapon State, to the NPT. As such, Austria, like many other non-nuclear States, has assumed its share of responsibility towards the international community by renouncing not only nuclear weapons but also by submitting all raw materials or all special fissile products originating from any peaceful nuclear activity to the safeguards stipulated in an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. My country has also unilaterally given up the use of nuclear energy for electricity production, in keeping with the wishes of its people as expressed in a referendum on this subject. Hence Austria remains all the more

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convinced of the fact that only the NPT, and a universally accepted NPT, can stem nuclear proliferation and at the same time provide an appropriate context for progressive disarmament. Consequently, Austria appeals to all the countries that have not yet done so to accede to this treaty and thereafter to respect its obligations faithfully as well as to the contracting parties to extend it and continue to apply it. We consider this appeal to be legitimate in view of the obligations that Austria has assumed and our country's fundamental interest in a world in which the sovereignty, security and independence of a State are not endangered by the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is from this point of view that Austria has already spoken, and will continue to do so, in favour of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Austria attaches a great deal of importance to this legally binding instrument, which has been seen to be very effective in the implementation of its objectives, remaining in force without any conditions or limits in order to be able to continue to contribute to international security.

All these thoughts have very close links with the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1995. My Government believes that the long-term success and credibility of such an indefinite and unconditional extension envisaged for the NPT will depend to a great extent on the progress made in other areas that are closely connected with non-proliferation itself. Allow me to mention two subjects that have pride of place on the agenda and programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, namely the nuclear test ban and the ban on the production of fissile material. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois Mock, in a statement to this Conference in 1988, and also the Austrian Parliament, have on many occasions spoken in favour of the speedy conclusion of a convention banning all nuclear testing in all natural environments. Such a ban would be an historic step towards renunciation of the development of new nuclear weapons. At the same time, the effects on the environment caused by underground testing, which has not as yet been banned by the present partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty, could be reduced and even eliminated by such a convention. In the context of a future comprehensive ban on testing, Austria takes note with great satisfaction of the various national moratoriums that have been declared by nuclear-weapon States as well as the determination with which member States have said they will give absolute priority to this delicate subject.

A nuclear test ban would be seriously undermined if it was not subject to strict, precise, flexible and transparent verification measures. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has made considerable progress recently. The Ad Hoc Committee benefits from the advice of the technical experts and the practical experience acquired through simulation of elements of the future verification system and the international data centre. Allow me at this point to recall that last summer Austria formally submitted its offer to host this future organization and all its subsidiary bodies, including the international data centre, in Vienna. I have come to this forum to confirm this offer and assure you that the Austrian Government will do everything it can to facilitate the establishment of the new organization in Vienna. As several delegations have already emphasized, the future organization will be able to derive a great deal of benefit from proximity and close cooperation

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with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, it goes without saying that the Austrian offer at this stage does not prejudge in any way a subsequent decision with regard to possible links between the future nuclear-test-ban treaty organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Among the other issues that are of topical importance for this Conference, I wish to comment briefly on the prohibition of the production of fissile material. Austria regards this as a measure accompanying efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. An additional reason why Austria attaches special importance to this subject is the fact that it is surrounded by many countries that use nuclear energy intensively for peaceful purposes. Hence a special awareness in Austrian public opinion of all questions regarding nuclear safety. With regard to negative security assurances, I wish to emphasize that these could encourage a number of countries to opt for denuclearization and to take the non-nuclear route as far as weapons are concerned. With regard to outer space, I will confine myself to emphasizing the importance of this work for a country such as Austria, which for many years has been able to play a major role in the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Austria would like to restate its resolute support for any initiative that is designed to protect space from the dangers of an arms race.

To conclude my statement I wish once again to draw your attention to the subject of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Despite many initiatives, declarations, consultations, reports and official documents, this delicate problem has not as yet been resolved. On many occasions my country has not failed to emphasize the advantages that would result from its admission as a full member of this Conference. We believe our aspirations are supported by resolution 49/77 B of the United Nations General Assembly, which in its last operative paragraph requests this Conference to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of 1995, in a significant expansion of its composition. We have taken good note of the efforts that you, Sir, have been making in pursuance of this resolution, as well as your intention to arrange for the appointment of a special coordinator. I wish to emphasize to you that Austria is keeping this matter under firm scrutiny.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Mr. President, allow me first to extend our warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial time. My delegation is fully confident that your wealth of experience and expertise in the field of disarmament will be invaluable inputs to the work of the CD during your tenure of office. May I also pay tribute to your predecessor Ambassador Nasseri for his able leadership during his presidency in the closing month of the 1994 session and the inter-sessional period? Colleagues attending this session have addressed

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warm words of welcome to me, and I should like to reciprocate their kind sentiments. I look forward to entering into close ties of friendship and cooperation with them all.

The year 1995 is special from the point of view of arms limitation and disarmament. Not only does this year mark the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, but it will also witness in April the convening of the historic review and extension Conference of the NPT. This Conference is an event of such importance that the subject of the Conference and its related issues dominated the deliberations of the First Committee at the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, although it was not formally on the agenda of the Committee. The same applies to our proceedings here in the CD during the first part of this session.

There is no doubt that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remains one of the foremost security concerns of the international community today, and that its prevention is a major challenge facing us. We should rightly accord the twin questions of nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons non-proliferation the highest priority on our disarmament agenda. My country is fully committed to, and strongly supports, the continuation and the further strengthening of the current regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the NPT and other related nuclear disarmament and arms limitation measures. Accordingly, we should like to see a successful outcome of the NPT review and extension Conference.

Following the conclusion of the cold war, fundamental transformations have taken place and are still taking place in the international political and security environment. We need to readjust and revise our security concepts in keeping with this new environment. During the era of the cold war, the security concept prevailing in the two opposing camps was confrontational. In the present context that confrontation has given way to cooperation. For this reason my delegation subscribes to a new concept of global, comprehensive and cooperative security. While internal security matters will remain within the competence of member States, security problems of global dimensions require a global response and should be viewed in the global context. This concept of security is comprehensive and multi-dimensional, covering the whole spectrum of strategic, political, military, economic, trade, social and cultural aspects. It is cooperative in the sense that security interests of the State or a group of States must not be attained at the expense of others, and that these interests should indeed be advanced by promoting the common security interests of all States in cooperation with one another.

Viewed from the vantage point of this concept, the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a global problem requiring a global cooperative response. There should exist no justification for parochial national policies of nuclear posturing by nuclear-weapon States. Nor is there any justification or relevance today for their continuing dependence on the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which are predicated on the early first use of nuclear weapons. It is in our shared common security interests that

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nuclear-weapon States carry out their obligations for nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT and contribute to substantive progress towards the conclusion of a CTBT, a treaty banning fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes, and a multilateral legal instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It will also be in our comprehensive security interests that States parties to the NPT further promote their cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and technological development. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties, on their part, have the responsibility to adhere to their obligations under the Treaty. It will also advance our common and cooperative security interests if the remaining reluctant States overcome their regional differences and join the NPT to take us further down the road towards the universality of membership of the Treaty. In this context, we are happy to note, and warmly welcome, the recent accessions to the NPT by Algeria, Argentina, Ukraine and other countries.

At the conceptual level, the goal of nuclear disarmament is consistent with our concept of global, comprehensive and cooperative security. This concept underscores the need to reduce dependence by nuclear-weapon States on their doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In the present-day environment, the doctrines of nuclear deterrence have become more and more irrelevant; and nuclear weapons, under the current nuclear policies, have turned out to be overvalued currencies of power carried over from the cold war era. There exists a genuine need to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons. By so doing, nuclear-weapon States will establish a powerful and effective political and moral barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I should, therefore, like to stress here that the time is opportune for nuclear-weapon States to rethink, review and revise their nuclear doctrines and policies in the light of present-day realities.

Undoubtedly the top priority of the current 1995 session of the CD is the intensive negotiation and speedy completion of the CTBT. By resolution 49/70, the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly calls on the CD to proceed to a new phase of negotiation. It further urges all States in the CD, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate as a high-priority task, and to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Accordingly, the CTBT being one of the crucial issues that will impinge on the outcome of the forthcoming NPT Conference, it is imperative that the CD complete, or largely complete, the draft CTBT by April this year. At the very minimum, we should like to see by April this year agreed texts on the scope of the treaty and on the principal issues of verification, and a commitment by all in the CD to finalize the draft treaty text before the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. This means that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is required to resolve these basic issues in the course of the first part of this session. We have complete trust in the leadership and far-sightedness of Ambassador Dembinski; and we trust that, under his skilful chairmanship, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be able to produce timely results. We wish him all the best in his endeavours.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

I take this opportunity to welcome the positive initiatives recently announced by the United States delegation, namely the decision to extend the moratorium on United States nuclear tests until a CTB treaty enters into force, the proposal to extend the CD session if necessary, and the withdrawal of the United States proposal for a right to withdraw from the CTB treaty 10 years after its entry into force. We believe that these initiatives and proposals will help provide an impetus to substantive negotiation of a CTBT.

The production and stockpiling of fissile materials constitute a continuing danger to international security. A ban on fissile materials is fundamental to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have agreed in the CD that the CD is the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty banning fissile materials. There is also agreement that an ad hoc committee be established. A consensus draft mandate for the ad hoc committee has, however, eluded us. It remains our ardent hope that consultations, skilfully conducted by our Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon, will soon bear fruit by way of reaching a consensus mandate. My delegation takes the view that a ban on fissile materials requires the prohibition of the production of fissile materials usable for weapons and other nuclear explosive purposes, addressing in an appropriate way the issue of the existing stockpiles of fissile materials. A ban on fissile materials should be a nuclear-disarmament-oriented measure. It should not be merely a non-proliferation-oriented step. We believe that this basic concept should be reflected in the draft mandate of the ad hoc committee. Another important question is that of negative security assurances. The current international political climate is favourable to substantive progress in this area. Earlier on, I underscored the need to de-emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons in the post-cold-war era. NSA and other restraints on the use of nuclear weapons are essential steps in the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons. In this context, I am happy to note that the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, by resolution 49/75 K, requested the legal opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. This will give an impetus to the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons.

These considerations provide a sound rationale to conclude an international convention on NSA. For, if nuclear-weapon States continue to put a premium on the security and political value of nuclear weapons, it will only serve to give an added impetus to the threshold States to go nuclear. It is only by carrying forward the process of the negation of the role of nuclear weapons and by implementing nuclear disarmament measures that nuclear-weapon States can advance the long-term interests of effectively preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And it is in this conceptual framework that the question of NSA should be viewed. Many countries have presented the suggestion for a United Nations Security Council resolution, encompassing both NSA and positive security assurances. We feel that such a resolution can constitute a helpful initial step, provided that it is crafted in such a way as to create an international legal norm, outlawing the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States in a comprehensive manner. Myanmar takes the view, however, that even if such a Security Council resolution comes to pass, there remains a need to conclude a legally binding international

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convention on NSA. Accordingly, we encourage all efforts to achieve progress in this crucial area with a view to early conclusion of such a convention.

In this connection, a draft protocol to the NPT on security assurances, contained in document CD/1277 dated 6 September 1994, tabled in the CD last year by some 12 countries including Myanmar, can constitute a positive basis for the elaboration of an international legal instrument on security assurances. My delegation takes a flexible stance, and we feel that such a legal instrument may be in any format - a convention or a treaty, not necessarily a protocol to the NPT - so long as it has legally binding force.

The question of expansion of membership of the CD remains unresolved. We all agree that there is a need for expanding the membership to include new members, reflecting new realities of the present. My delegation wishes to reaffirm its view that expansion of the CD can be achieved on the basis of the list of 23 new member States, as proposed by the then Special Coordinator for this question, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia. We should endeavour to overcome the current impasse on this question. As far as my delegation is concerned, we can agree to the formula of taking the decision now, and having actual membership of new members take effect at a later opportune date, as an interim measure, if that also be acceptable to other members of the CD.

The current year is considered by many as being significant for the historic anniversaries I referred to earlier on, and also in terms of its critical importance for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It brings us new challenges and opportunities. It is in our collective interest to renew our determination and commitment, and to redouble our efforts to make speedy and substantive progress in the CD, particularly in the areas of CTBT, NSA and a ban on fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive purposes. By so doing, we shall be able to meet the challenges and to seize the opportunities offered by this year 1995.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I do not have any other speakers on my list for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, please allow me, through you, to express my thanks on behalf of the Western Group to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for showing once more the interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament by conveying the message as read out earlier by the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky. We have listened attentively to this message, which is a clear expression of the Women's League's concern for international peace and security. The records of the Conference on Disarmament show that this body takes its task, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament agreements, very seriously. The intensive way in which negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty have resumed this 1995 session is only one proof of this. I would like to thank the Women's League once again for the interest they are showing in our work. The Conference will feel encouraged by it in the fulfilment of its important responsibilities.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): We have listened with great attention to the message read out to the CD from the participants at the International Women's Day. We thank the women for their message, which, as you said yourself, Mr. President, has become a well-established practice. It is always very interesting to be kept informed of the views of the Women's Day participants on disarmament issues and their views can also be of help in our work. I am particularly pleased to note that Women's Day this year pays a special tribute to my compatriot, the late Inga Thorsson, who devoted her life to work for peace. She was also for many years a prominent representative in this body. As a politician, Inga Thorsson made many achievements; one of the most important ones was probably that she played a decisive role in the decision of the Swedish Government in 1968 to forgo for all time the nuclear option.

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): I have asked for the floor to make a brief statement on behalf of our Group of 21 to welcome the presence of the representatives of the 1995 women's gathering to observe International Women's Day. The members of the Group of 21 express their appreciation to NGO communities through the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for the important message addressed to the Conference on Disarmament and for their valuable contribution to the cause of peace and disarmament. It is encouraging to note that this year's meeting is focusing on international security as it relates to environment, development, international relations and disarmament. The members of the Group of 21 would like to wish them every success in their noble endeavour at the international women's gathering and the Group extends its warm greetings to them on the celebration of International Women's Day.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I join previous speakers in thanking the Women's League for the interest that they have consistently taken in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for the message that they have sent us on International Women's Day this year. Women, Sir, have a particular status in our negotiations. They constitute, as we know, half of the population of the world and while they are the least involved in wars and conflicts, they invariably and increasingly now bear the brunt of the consequences of these wars and these conflicts. We are, therefore, deeply appreciative to them for bringing us a message of peace and light which we hope will shine as a beacon before us in our task.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Kamal. We share your feelings.

Mr. HU (China) (translated from Chinese): The 8 March International Women's Day is just around the corner. Today, the representatives of certain international women's organizations have come here to sit in our Conference. The Chinese delegation would like to extend a welcome to them.

Issues of arms control and disarmament are important matters affecting the peace, security and development of the peoples of the world. Today, when the world is undergoing colossal changes, international disarmament efforts have made certain headway but heavy and difficult tasks, grave and numerous challenges still lie ahead. It goes without saying that the cause of disarmament in the future will be even more important and arduous. For this

(Mr. Hu, China)

reason, it requires more than ever the common effort of the international community, including women. Many international and national NGOs, including women's organizations, have made many contributions in this respect. They deserve our warm tribute.

This September, over 30,000 women representatives from different walks of life in more than 100 countries and various regions will gather in China's capital, Beijing, for the holding of the Fourth World Conference on Women. China at present is coordinating with the United Nations in order to do a good job in preparing for this Conference. We wish the Conference every success in realizing its goal of equality, development and peace. Its success will undoubtedly provide a new incentive and new momentum to our work of disarmament and arms control.

I would like to take this opportunity to offer in advance my congratulations to our female colleagues of all delegations, the ladies sitting in the public gallery and the female staff members of the secretariat.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): As the Coordinator of the Eastern European Group for this month, I too would like to thank the representatives of the international non-governmental women's organizations wholeheartedly for the statement made on their behalf at today's meeting. This statement contains many important ideas which, we are certain, provide the members of the Conference on Disarmament with food for thought and have much in common with the positions of the States of the Eastern European Group. I should also, on behalf of the Group, like to congratulate the representatives of women's organizations and all women present in this room on the forthcoming International Women's Day, 8 March, and wish them further success.

Mr. BENDJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I find myself here in your midst in the Conference on Disarmament for the first time, I wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for your welcome and for the kind words you were good enough to address to me. I am convinced that on the part of all my colleagues I shall find a spirit of cooperation in the pursuit of the objectives of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to reaffirm the complete readiness of my delegation to work with you and with all the other colleagues for the strengthening of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the area of disarmament. Finally, I should like to convey my greetings to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, as well as the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and to wish them and yourself every success in your task.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and welcome to this forum. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor? None do. On behalf of the entire Conference, I should like to thank the representatives of the women's associations present here and to say to them that this morning we have had a few additional rays of light thanks to the

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

extension of the NPT is not a mandate for the nuclear Powers to possess nuclear arms forever but, on the contrary, a guarantee of the irreversibility of the process of nuclear disarmament, stability and security in the world.

In his speech at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin pointed out that our country is in favour of marking the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in a worthy way with the signing of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We believe that all the conditions are ripe for this purpose. In our opinion, we have reached a stage in the negotiations where we can secure consensus on the main elements of the treaty. First of all this relates to the first article of the CTBT, concerning the scope of the ban. Our starting-point is that in drafting the provisions regarding the scope of the treaty we should rely on the language of article I of the 1963 Moscow partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty, with the addition, of course, of a ban on underground tests. The Moscow Treaty has proved its effectiveness, and there are no grounds for changing time-tested language for the scope of the prohibitions. At the same time we must say frankly that proposals to ban preparatory activities for nuclear tests, or computer simulations, for example, cannot secure consensus support, principally because it would be impossible to monitor the implementation of such bans, and therefore only hinder progress on this issue.

Russia favours a treaty of unlimited duration. In this connection we appreciate the fact that the United States of America has dropped the proposal it made last year concerning "simplified" withdrawal from the treaty 10 years after its entry into force. An important achievement of the CTBT negotiations is the fact that in the Conference on Disarmament the positions of States on the international monitoring system (IMS) are drawing closer together. The main element of Russia's approach to that system is the need to combine effectiveness with reasonable sufficiency, especially from the point of view of financial outlays. The timely creation and proper functioning of an international system for verifying compliance with a CTBT essentially depend on the solution found to the problem of covering the expenditure involved. This will determine the ability and readiness of States to adopt and use the IMS, in other words the comprehensiveness and reliability of the verification regime. Russia's position on this issue, which is close to that of a number of other countries, is that future expenses, including the costs associated with the creation of new stations and other elements and the modernization of existing ones related to both the IMS and on-site inspections should be funded by the States parties through the organization in accordance with the United Nations scale of contributions. This approach would be in keeping with the principle of fair distribution and would increase the interest of the States parties in the timely establishment and effective functioning of the international verification system.

Another facet of the problem of funding concerns the state of readiness of the international monitoring system when the treaty enters into force. This calls for the allocation of funds in advance, and as experience shows, it will not be an easy task. Its solution could be facilitated by using an evolutionary approach to the establishment of the international monitoring system, with the initial version being established at a reasonable acceptable minimum based on existing technical means.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

On-site inspections are of great importance in verification of compliance with the CTBT. We proceed from the position that States parties concerned about a suspicious event may use all available means to clarify the situation without any restriction on the right to request at any time an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any other State party or in an area located outside the jurisdiction of any State. As we see it, the request for an inspection should be examined by the executive council of the future treaty organization as rapidly as possible. A decision to conduct an inspection should be adopted by the executive council by a majority of no less than two thirds. This procedure would practically eliminate the issue of possible abuse of the inspections.

In our view the first stage of the inspection should be of limited duration, for example up to 40 days. This would make it possible, in cases where a suspicious event has occurred, to narrow down the area of search, pinpoint the event that has caused concern and obtain the data necessary to take decisions on further action, possibly including drilling and sample-taking. Such a decision, once confirmed by the executive council, would make the transition to the second stage, including drilling. Both stages should be funded by the organization. This approach seems to us to be the most rational and efficient, making it possible to determine the nature of the suspicious event very rapidly. In this way the problem of disparities in the financial capacities of the participants will vanish.

Russia consistently favours the launching of multilateral negotiations in the CD for the drafting of an agreement on a monitored ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. We proceed from the position that a multilateral agreement of this nature should include not only all nuclear States but also other countries that possess relevant installations for the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel. Russia considers that the agreement should ban the future production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes. We regard the IAEA safeguards system as the central instrument for the verification of the future agreement. However, there is a major problem here, and this is the high potential cost of verification in the nuclear countries, as well as its technical complexity. It is important to think through and discuss how to apply the IAEA safeguards in a way which is not only as effective as possible but also cost-effective and affordable for the international community. The Russian delegation hopes that the Special Coordinator, Canadian Ambassador G. Shannon, will succeed in achieving consensus on the mandate of an ad hoc committee on the basis of the provisions of the resolution of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was adopted without a vote, and that the ad hoc committee will start working before the end of this part of the CD session. We believe that those who are trying to revise the consensus reached within the United Nations bear responsibility for blocking progress in the field of nuclear disarmament in this important area and are hindering the practical implementation of the provisions of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

We are deeply convinced that the prompt conclusion of arrangements providing for reliable security assurances for the non-nuclear States parties to the NPT would be in the interests of strengthening international security

(The President)

words they were kind enough to address to us in their message. We are all very grateful to them and we would like this visit, which has become a very valuable tradition for the Conference, to become a regular one.

(continued in English)

The secretariat, at may request, has circulated a revised tentative timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I consider that this revised timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before suspending this plenary meeting, I should like to remind you that we will be holding, in five minutes time, an informal meeting which will be limited to the presence of members of the Conference only.

The meeting was suspended at 11.15 a.m. and resumed at 1.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 698th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

We shall first take up, and formalize, the agreement reached at the informal meeting concerning the request from Viet Nam to participate in the work of the Conference during 1995. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite Viet Nam to participate in its work during 1995?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 February 1995, at 10 a.m. I would like to inform you that the next plenary meeting will be followed by a meeting to be chaired by Ambassador Kamal to hear his thoughts for the 1995 session on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. If there are no other requests for the floor, I will adjourn this plenary meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.